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buyer who pays in cash or whose check or note is paid before reposses-
sion by allowing a tardy buyer to escape liability, and it would conform
with the intention of the parties that the amount of a check or note given
as cash down payment would be paid. In the final analysis, the seller
and buyer would be neither better nor worse off than they would have
been if cash had been paid in the place of the check or note.
Roy W. DAvis, JR.
Labor Law-Fair Labor Standards Act-Nonexempt Work
Tolerance for Executives
A great many decisions determining whether, under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, a particular employee is a "bona fide executive," have
turned on the sections of the regulations issued by the Administrator
of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor relating to
nonexempt work tolerance. One writer has estimated that at least half
of the overtime violations of the Act emanate from misinterpretations of
the executive exemption.1 The various administrative regulations dealing
with this exemption have therefore been chosen for comment in this note.
Section 13 (a) (1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act exempts from
the provisions of Section 6 (minimum wage), and Section 7 (maximum
hours) of the Act, any employee who is employed in a bona fide execu-
tive capacity, as such term is defined and delimited by the regulations
of the Administrator.2 The reason for this exemption is that a bona
fide executive is not ordinarily in the group that requires the protection
of the Act.3
It is to be noted at the outset that the Administrator's definition of
a "bona fide executive" is given Congressional sanction and is controlling
in determining who shall be exempt from the Act.4 The North Carolina
Supreme Court, in applying the Administrator's definition, has said:
"Valid definitions within the delegated power speak with authority and
become the dictionary of the law." 5
Since 1938, when the Fair Labor Standards Act became effective,
the Administrator has acted three times to define the term "bona fide
I Bookstabler, Exemption of the "Boss Man" Under Section 13 (a), (1) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 69 N. J. L. J. 81 (1946). It is to be noted that since
all of the requirements of the definition must be met and since Section (f) of the
present definition requires that the employee be compensated on a salary basis at
a rate of not less than $55 per week, except in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands
where the minimum salary is $30, there are few cases where the general minimum
wage requirements of the act have been involved; most of the cases involve com-
pensation for overtime.
252 STAT. 1067 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §213 (1952). The Act's original provision
has remained unchanged since 1938.
' Bookstabler, supra note 1.
'Zaetz v. General Instrument Corp., 21 N. J. Misc. 76, 30 A. 2d 504 (1943).
' Pye v. Atlantic Co., 223 N. C. 92, 96, 25 S. E. 2d 401, 404 (1943).
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executive capacity." In each of these definitions there has been some
limit placed on the amount of nonexempt work which may be performed
by an executive employee without losing his exemption. In the definition
which went into effect simultaneously with the Act itself, the term
"employee employed in a bona fide executive capacity" was defined in
relation to nonexempt work tolerance as "one who does no substantial
amount of work of the same nature as that performed by nonexempt
employees of the employer." 6 While this original "white-collar" regu-
lation defined both executive and administrative employees together,
both the later regulations contain a separate definition for exempt admin-
istrative and executive employees.7
Section (f) of the Administrator's definition of an executive em-
ployee, which was in effect from 1940 to 1950, relating to nonexempt
work, required that the employee's work of the same nature as that per-
formed by nonexempt employees not exceed 20 per cent of the number
of hours worked in any workweek by nonexempt employees under his
direction, except where the employee was in sole charge of an inde-
pendent establishment or a physically separated branch establishment.8
During this same period there was no similar 20 per cent limitation in
the Administrator's definition of an "administrative employee." Since
there was no similar requirement at least one court held a factory super-
intendent to be exempt as an administrative employee even though the
time he spent on nonexempt activities exceeded 20 per cent of the work-
week of the nonexempt employees under his direction, on the ground
that the nonexempt activities were not wholly without relation to his
primary responsibility." This ruling illustrates the distinction which
still exists between executive and administratve employees.
The present defintion of "bona fide executive," which became effec-
tive on January 25, 1950, lists six requirements which must be met
before the employee is exempt from the coverage of the Act.10 If an
'George Lawley & Sons Corp. v. South, 140 F. 2d 439 (1st Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 322 U. S. 746 (1944) ; Roberts v. John Sperry Co., 7 W. H. Cases (BNA)
349 (D. Mass. 1947).
'WAGE AND HoUR MANUAL (BNA) 20:615 (1948).
829 CODE FED. REGs. § 541.1 (Cum. Supp. 1949).
Sparks v. Pedersen, 9 W. H. Cases (BNA) 156 (D. Conn. 1949).
10 "The term 'employee employed in a bona fide executive ... capacity' in sec-
tion 13 (a) (1) of the act shall mean any employee-
(a) whose primary duty consists of the management of the enterprise in which
he is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof;
and
(b) who customarily and regularly directs the work of two or more other
employees therein; and
(c) who has the authority to hire or fire other employees or whose suggestions
and recommendations as to the hiring or firing and as to the advancement and
promotion or any other change of status of other employees will be given particular
weight; and
(d) who customarily and regularly exercises discretionary powers; and
(e) who does not devote more than 20 per cent of his hours worked in the
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employee fails to meet any one of the requirements, he is not exempt."
Section (e) of the present regulations takes the place of Section (f)
of the regulations in effect until 1950 and requires that the employee shall
not devote more than 20 per cent of his hours worked in the workweek
to activities which are not directly and closely related to the performance
of his managerial functions.'
2
As has been noted, prior to 1940 the definition of a "bona fide execu-
tive" used the words "substantial amount" in referring to the quantity
of nonexempt work which the executive might perform without loss of
his exemption.'3  Much criticism was directed to the vagueness and
ambiguity of this wording.' 4 The Stein Report, which was later adopted
as the official explanation of the new definitions in 1940,15 suggested
that instead of deletion, an arithmetic-l equivalent be substituted.' 6 The
result was the old Section (f) requirement that an employee not spend
more than 20 per cent of the time spent by his subordinates doing non-
exempt work. These requirements were obviously inserted to prevent
merely nominal classification of employees for the purpose of evading the
coverage of the act.17 A typical and unsuccessful attempt at evasion
was an employer's affixation of the label "building superintendent" to
an employee whose duties would generally be performed by a janitor and
who exercised only slight supervision over other employees.' 8
Under old Section (f) it was possible for an employee to spend more
than 20 per cent of his own time in nonexempt activities, at purely
physical tasks of the same general nature as those of the employees work-
ing under him, and still be exempt as an executive. The Stein Report
said that the base upon which the percentage was to be taken was not the
workveek of the employee himself, since on that basis he could obtain
exemption merely by increasing his hours of exempt work.' 9 Two
workweek to activities which are not directly and closely related to the performance
of the work described in paragraphs (a) through (d) of this section: Provided,
That this paragraph (e) shall not apply in the case of an employee who is in sole
charge of an independent establishment or a physically separated branch establish-
ment, or who owns at least a 20 per cent interest in the enterprise in which he is
employed; and
(f) who is compensated for his services on a salary basis at a rate of not less
than $55 per week. (or $30 per week if employed in Puerto Rico or the Virgin
Islands) exclusive of board, lodging, or other facilities... " 29 CODE FED. REGS.§ 541.1 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
12 29 CODE FED. REGS. § 541.99 (c) (Cum. Supp. 1953) ; Fanelli v. United States
Gypsum Co., 141 F. 2d 216 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Rankin v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 98
F. Supp. 1 (D. N. 3. 1951); Kreeft v. R. W. Bates-Price Dye Works, Inc., 63
F. Supp. 881 (S. D. N. Y. 1945).
"29 CODE Fm. REGs. § 541.1 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
1129 CODE FED: REGS. § 541.1 (Supp. 1938).
" WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 20:93 (1948).
"
2 WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 20:83 (1948).
" WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 20:93 (1948).
" Jones v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, 75 F. Supp. 86 (D. Md. 1947).
" Schmidt v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 148 F. 2d 294 (2d Cir. 1945).
"
9 WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 20:94 (1948).
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cases show the problems that arose from this point of view. In Walling
v. Morris,2 0 the United States Supreme Court said that if the suit had
been brought by the employee to collect for overtime rather than by the
Administrator to enjoin violation of the Act, the employee would not be
exempt in the absence of a showing in the record of the extent to which
the laborers under his direction devoted themselves to the type of work
performed by the employee in question. In this case, the record did
show that the employee devoted 25 per cent of his own time to nonexempt
activities. In Grant v. Bergdorf and Goodman Company,2 1 it was held
that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the nonexempt
hours were to be measured by a percentage of the particular employee's
workweek rather than by the workweek of those under his direction.
Another holding under old Section (f) was that the nature of the
work, and not necessarily performance of the same type work as the
subordinates, controlled in determining exemption. Thus the work of
editors of a newspaper, although not of the same type as that of the
reporters under their supervision, in that it consisted mainly of copy-
reading, was of a general nonexempt nature and therefore the editors
were not exempt.
22
It is to be remembered that the present regulations require that the
employee shall not devote more than 20 per cent of his own hours worked
in a workveek to nonexempt activities. It is also to be remembered that
exemptions from the coverage of the Act are to be strictly interpreted,23
and that the employer seeking to avoid payment of overtime has the
burden of proving that the employee is exempt. 24 This burden must be
met by establishing the exemption by a clear preponderance of the evi-
dence.2 5 Of course, the burden of establishing the existence and extent
of overtime is on the employee.
20
The real problem is in determining whether particular work of the
employee is exempt. As one court expressed it, the application is
"troublesome because actual experience teaches that the effective, thor-
ough, conscientious executive or administrator frequently lends his own
hands, in addition to the words of advice..., as he teaches and instructs
those for whose work he is responsible, and whose work he desires to
press to a speedy and accurate conclusion. ' 27 Granting that this is an
20332 U. S. 422 (1947). 21172 F. 2d 109 (2d Cir. 1949).
22 American Newspaper Guild v. Republican Ptublishing Co., 271 App. Div. 1026,
68 N. Y. S. 2d 906 (2d Dep't 1947).2:A. H. Phillips, Inc., v. Walling, 324 U. S. 490 (1945).
rWood Lumber Co. v. Tobin, 199 F. 2d 455 (6th Cir. 1952); Richter v.
Barrett, 173 F. 2d 320 (3d Cir. 1949); Abram v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., 49
F. Supp. 393 (S. D. Cal. 1943). Contra: Zaetz v. General Instrument Corp., 21
N. J. Misc. 76, 30 A. 2d 504 (1943).
2 Walling v. Newman, 61 F. Supp. 971 (D. Iowa 1945).0 Rankin v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 1 (D. N. J. 1951).
27 Marian v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 18, 19 (N. D. Tex. 1946).
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accurate statement of the general situation, the courts are nevertheless
in disagreement as to whether the exemption should be whittled away
where the executive employee steps in to help. Another court noted,
"It is an American characteristic of the relationship of executive and
those under him that the foreman might 'pitch in' almost any time to
help. He would be the exception if he didn't."28  The court then held
such an employee to be an executive. However, still another court said
of an employee that "he is a good employee and pitches in and helps
whenever and wherever he is needed. The Administrator in adopting
his regulations intended to make an employee of this class subject to
the Act."29
At any rate, the regulations and cases have established as exempt
work certain types of manual work performed by executives. The
present regulations, in addition to exempting manual work which is
directly and closely related to the executive's managerial function, 30
specify two situations in which normally nonexempt work will be con-
sidered exempt because of its over-all relation to the executive duties of
the employee: (1) work done because of the existence of a real emer-
gency,31 and (2) infrequent or occasional tasks performed as a means
of properly carrying out management functions.32  These regulations
follow closely the rules set out by the Kentucky court in the leading
case, Mafizola v. Hardy-Burlingham Mining Company.33
In that case, the employee claimed certain time was nonexempt. In
this was included time he spent checking his men in and out of the mine
and getting together supplies such as time and report books, first aid
equipment, and safety devices. The court said it was apparent that those
duties were such as are performed by an executive employee and are
not manual labor or nonexempt work. The court further held that the
"executive's" teaching of first aid to his men was exempt work. More
important for our purposes, perhaps, was the court's holding that time
spent by the employee acting as a watchman during a strike was exempt.
The court said that "ordinarily a watchman's job is nonexempt work,
yet when a strike is in progress and a foreman undertakes a watchman's
duties, he is performing such services in an executive capacity. In such
circumstances, it is only an executive employee who is not a member of
the union on strike who can be depended on to perform such duties."3 4
8 lougherty v. James Vernon Co., 74 F. Supp. 364, 369 (E. D. Mich. 1947).
2' Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 69 F. Supp. 599, 606 (S. D. Fla. 1947),
rev'd on other grounds, 336 U. S. 187 (1949).
2029 CODE FED. REGS. § 541.108 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
29 CODE FED. REGS. § 541.109 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
29 CODE FED. REGS. § 541.110 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
's306 Ky. 492, 207 S. W. 2d 769 (1947).
2" Id. at 497, 207 S. W. 2d at 771; accord, McReynolds v. Pocahontas, 192 F. 2d
301 (4th Cir. 1951).
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Another court observed before the present regulations were adopted
that "there are times when the executive will appear to the observer as
doing. manual work, when, as a matter of fact, he is merely making an
investigation or exercising his discretion in laying out work for his subor-
dinates."3 5 Work in keeping production and personnel records, inspect-
ing and testing work of the employees and making recommendations
following such inspections, and manual labor in demonstrations or emer-
gencies,30 is not work which is to be counted against the nonexempt
work tolerance.
In an interesting case which may mark the outer limits of exemption,
engineers, whose duties included making necessary repairs and spending
a small amount of their time cleaning and oiling machinery, in addition
to making constant observation and regular inspections, were held to be
exempt by the United States Supreme Court.3 7  Here, however, the
employees under their direction were firemen and coal passers and the
supervisory work was not of the same type as that of the subordinates.
The dissent attacked the sufficiency of the amount of discretion which the
engineers exercised rather than the type of work which they performed.
Several other circumstances have been considered by the courts in
determining whether the employee's work was exempt. One considera-
tion is whether the work which is claimed to be nonexempt was per-
formed as a part of the employee's duty, something which he was at least
expected to do, or whether it was done of the employee's own volition.38
Thus, the fact that the plaintiff's mechanical tasks were performed on
a voluntary basis was accorded some weight in one case.30 And where
the supervision and nianagement of a department was the employee's
primary duty, the North Carolina Supreme Court said that the duty was
uninterrupted "except where, as a matter of convenience, plaintiff as-
sisted in some work which was regularly in the routine of other em-
ployees." 40 However, where an employee owed his job to his ability to
make necessary adjustments and keep machinery in operation, his work
was nonexempt. 4
1
Another circumstance which has been considered is whether the
employee in a union plant is or is not a member of the union. In one
case, the Supreme Court took cognizance of the fact that the union bad
abandoned a long contested claim of the right to represent engineers at
" Corey v. Detroit Steel Corp., 52 F. Supp. 138 (E. D. Mich. 1943).
"6 Evans v. Continental Motors Corp., 105 F. Supp. 784 (E. D. Mich. 1952).
Walling v. General Industries, Co., 330 U. S. 545 (1947).
'
8 Evans v. Continental Motors Corp., 105 F. Supp. 784 (E. D. Mich. 1952).
See 29 CODE FEn. REGS. § 541.110 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
Pugh v. Lindsay, 206 F. 2d 43 (4th Cir. 1953).
40 Pye v. Atlantic Co., 223 N. C. 92, 96, 25 S. E. 2d 401, 403 (1943).
"'Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 69 F. Supp. 599, 606 (S. D. Fla. 1947),
rev'd on other grounds, 336 U. S. 187 (1949).
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the plant, thereby recognizing their supervisory status.42 Again, another
court said, in speaking of the nonunion head of the materials division of
a plant, that "under the ever watchful eyes of the shop stewards there
was little opportunity for [the employee] to carry parts by hand without
detection. ' 43 The court then held that the employee's nonexempt work
did not exceed the 20 per cent tolerance. It is not, however, reversible
error to refuse to receive testimony of union officials intended to show
labor's point of view with respect to classiiication in the industry gen-
erally, since it is the work of the particular employee that governs in
each individual case. 44
A third circumstance that the cases establish as important is whether
the employee claims to be an executive, or conversely, whether the em-
ployer recognizes the employee as nonexempt. One court was impressed
with the fact that both employee and employer told a union official that
the employee was a foreman when the official complained because the
employee had cut some hoods for parkas.45 In another case, the employee
was paid overtime for continuing to do the same type work after the
disputed period in which no overtime was paid. The court said that this
was consistent with a recognition by the employer that the employee
was not an executive. 4 6
The courts have generally had little trouble in deciding whether the
20 per cent tolerance has been exceeded, once they have decided which
work is exempt and which is not. Perhaps the extreme case segregating
exempt from nonexempt working time is Kaczanowski v. Home State
Bank.47 There the plaintiff-employee of the bank spent part of her time
in the teller's cage, in addition to carrying out her primary duty of
approving mortgages and loans. If the entire time that the employee
was supposed to be in the teller's cage had been considered, this time
would have exceeded the 20 per cent limitation in the Administrator's
regulations. The court said that the frequent interruptions which took
the plaintiff away from the cage to carry out her supervisory functions
made her total non-executive hours much less than 20 per cent.
Both the regulations in effect from 1940 to 1950 and those in effect
at the present time have made specific exceptions to the limit on non-
exempt work. The present regulations except from Section (e) two
classes of workers: (1) employees who are in sole charge of an inde-
pendent branch establishment, or a physically separated branch establish-
ment, and, (2) employees who own at least a 20 per cent interest in the
," Walling v. General Industries Co., 330 U. S. 545 (1947).
"3 Evans v. Continental Motors Corp., 105 F. Supp. 784, 788 (E. D. Mich. 1952).
" Gill v. Mesta Machine Co., 165 F. 2d 785 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334
U. S. 832 (1948).
" Kupperman v. M. & J. Becker, Inc., 198 F. 2d 765 (2d Cir. 1952).
40 Sawyer v. Selig Mfg. Co., 74 F. Supp. 319 (D. Mass. 1947).
'177 F. Supp. 602 (E. D.- Wisc. 1948).
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enterprise by which they are employed.48  The exception which relates
to part owners was not included in the old regulations. 4 There seems
to have been little litigation involving these exceptions.
The new requirement relating to nonexempt work differs from that
in the 1940-1950 regulations in the following ways:
1. The ceiling on the time which may be devoted to nonexempt
work is now measured by 20 per cent of the employee's own
time rather than by the weekly hours of the employees under
his direction.
2. Nonexempt work is now defined as work which is not "directly
and closely related" to the exempt duties, rather than "work
of the same nature" as that performed by the subordinates.60
While these changes may permit an employee to keep himself from
becoming an "executive" by performance of more nonexempt duties, as
was feared in the Stein Report of 1940,51 the scope of exempt work has
probably been broadened in that an employee may now perform certain
menial tasks which, because of their relation to his entire employment,
will not be counted against the nonexempt work tolerance.5 2
The Administrator's new definition includes a "streamlined" exemp-
tion for employees who are paid $100 weekly or more.53  Of these em-
ployees, the Administrator, after setting down certain requirements
which do not mention nonexempt work at all, says that they "shall be
deemed to meet all of the requirements" 54 of the definition of an execu-
tive. This would seem to indicate that as to these employees there is no
limit, except perhaps reasonableness, on the amount of nonexempt work
they may perform without losing their exempt status.
It must be remembered that the problem of whether a particular
employee is a "bona fide executive" does not arise until it has first been
determined that he is an employee. In one recent case, the plaintiff was
held not to be an employee within the meaning of the act when it ap-
peared that while he worked for the defendant corporation as a pattern
maker, or as a machinist at a specified hourly rate, he was also an officer,
a stockholder, and a director of the corporation.r5 Of course, the court
"29 CODE FED. RFas. § 541.1 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
,0 Editorial Analysis, WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 20:403 (1950). For
examples of employees in sole charge of physically separated branch, see Gruen-
stein v. Brust Footwear Corp., 72 F. Supp. 485 (E. D. Pa. 1947) ; Antis v. Mont-
gomery-Ward Co., 63 F. Supp. 669 (E. D. Mich. 1946).
"Editorial Analysis, WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 20:402 (1950).
"WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 20:83 (1948).
WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 20:402 (1950).
"Levitt, The "New" Wage and Hour Law, N. Y. U. THIRD ANNUAL CON-
FERENCE ON LABOR 269 (1950).
" 29 CODE FED. REGs. § 541.100 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
"Hoy v. Progress Pattern Co., 121 F. Supp. 371 (E. D. Mich. 1953).
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did not discuss the exception relating to part owners provided in Sec-
tion (e) of the regulations since the plaintiff was not even an employee.
In spite of the clear and helpful regulations supplementing the defi-
nition of a "bona fide executive" employee, it remains difficult to draw
a line with all true executives falling on one side and all remaining
employees falling on the other. All of the requirements of the Adminis-
trator's definition must be met. The requirement that will probably
continue to be most troublesome deals with nonexempt work tolerance.
The courts must still decide on the particular facts of each case whether
work is "directly and closely related," and, if it is not, then whether the
amount of that work exceeds the tolerance.
F. KENT BURNS
Real Property-Personal Restrictive Building Covenants
Although the case of Julian v. Lawton' presented for decision a very
narrow question on the matter of restrictive building covenants and
perhaps turned on an agency question as much as on the construction
of the covenant involved, the case is of interest because of the growth of
residential subdivisions in the last two decades and the almost universal
inclusion of certain restrictions imposed by means of covenants in the
deeds given for the lots in these developments.2 In this case the use
of the term "personal" as applied to a valid restrictive building covenant
is believed to be unique.
In the principal case, the grantor, in conveying certain lands in a
real estate subdivision which he was promoting, inserted in the deeds
certain restrictive covenants one of which stated "that no dwelling house
or other building shall be erected on the tract until the type and exterior
lines of the building to be erected shall have been approved by [the
grantor] or by an architect selected by him .... ,,3 The court held that
the covenant was personal to the grantor and that both the restriction
and the agency of the architect ceased to be effective at the death of the
grantor.
By definition, "a real covenant is one having for its object something
annexed to, inherent in or connected with land or other real property" ;4
it is a covenant that is said to "touch and concern" the land.5 These
1240 N. C. 436, 82 S. E. 2d 210 (1954).
"'The number of decisions in comparatively recent years involving the validity,
construction and effect of agreements restricting the use of real property indicate
the increasing use being made of them. This reflects, it has been aptly commented,
the expansion of the law to meet the demands of home owners for a protection
adequate to the more crowded conditions of modem life." TIFFANY, LAW OF REAL
PRoPEarY §858 (3rd ed. 1939).
'Julian v. Lawt6n, 240 N. C. 436, 437; 82 S. E. 2d 210, 211 (1954).
'14 Am. JuR., Covenants § 19, at p. 495 (1938); 21 C. J. S., Covenants § 22
(1940).5 TIFFANY, LAW OF RF.AL PROPERTY § 854; at p. 455 (3rd ed. 1939).
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